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Introduction
Between October 1979 and mid-summer 1982, the
Federal Reserve focused its attention on controlling
a narrow monetary aggregate (Ml) and relied pri-
marily on nonborrowed reseives as the short-run
instrument for achieving its monetary target. This
brief but important period provides a unique op-
portunity to examine the dynamic effects of the
short-run monetary supply process.
Although many interesting issues could be ex-
amined, we concentrate on two that have received
little empirical attention: 1) the speed and dynamic
response patterns of both money and short-term
interest rates to changes in nonborrowed reserves,
and 2) the extent of "feedback" effects between
short-run shocks to money and the central bank's
provision of nonborrowed reserves.
We provide unique estimates of liquidity ef-
fects following changes in the supply of nonbor-
rowed reserves. This work originated over a
decade ago in the midst of heated debate about
Federal Reserve operating procedures and mone-
tary control. Although the debate has cooled,
there is renewed interest in understanding liquid-
ity effects because they are central to the mone-
tary policy transmission mechanism.
1 Using
monthly data, Leeper and Gordon (1992) show
that evidence about the existence of liquidity
effects is ambiguous. They conclude that a suc-
cessful characterization of such effects requires
the identification of private and public behavior.
This paper identifies liquidity effects through tem-
poral disaggregation and a structural specification
based on the mechanisms of monetary control.
Our approach is to disaggregate the time di-
mension of the analysis into the shortest period
of practical concern for most monetary policy
decisions. Thus, our estimation procedures ex-
ploit daily data collected by the Federal Re-
serve. A simplified structural model of the
short-run money supply process is developed
that, because of the paucity of variables avail-
able on a daily basis, is estimated using lagged
endogenous variables. We further emphasize
the short-run nature of the model by estimat-
ing separate statistical models, and therefore
separate effects, for each day of the week. Each
model includes controls for the Federal Open
Market Committee's (FOMC) Ml target growth
paths and is estimated in first-difference form.
Thus, the models focus only on very short-term
• 1 Bernanke and Blinder (1992) make a persuasive case for the
presence of liquidity effects in the U.S. economy. Christiano ant) Eichen-
baum (1992), Christiano (1991), and Coleman, Labadie, and Gilles
(1993) build explicit models of liquidity effects.behavior and abstract from longer-term rela-
tionships and policymaking. In essence, we ex-
amine the reaction of money and interest rates
to deviations of nonborrowed reserves from
weekly and longer-term target growth paths.
Thus, we control for those factors that are gen-
erally the focus of monthly or quarterly models
and examine the variability that is averaged
out in such analyses.
Statistical tests of the importance of day-by-
day effects are performed. We then use the esti-
mation results to simulate the short-run dynamic
relationships between nonborrowed reserves,
the federal funds rate, and a measure of transac-
tion accounts. These experiments provide in-
sights regarding the short-run money supply
process that are not accessible using the more
time-aggregated data of previous studies.
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I. The Model
On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve an-
nounced that it was switching its short-run op-
erating target from the federal funds rate to
nonborrowed reserves in an effort to better
control the money supply. By the latter part of
1982, the Fed had begun to deemphasize Ml
as its monetary target, with a resulting decline
in the use of nonborrowed reserves as its oper-
ating target.
3 During this brief period, however,
nonborrowed reserves appear to have been the
primary short-term instrument of central bank
policy, while the federal funds rate was deter-
mined primarily by market factors.
4
Stevens (1981) characterizes Federal Reserve
nonborrowed reserves policy during this period
as consisting of five steps. Steps one and two
occurred at the FOMC meetings and involved
the setting of yearly and short-run (inter-FOMC
meeting) paths for Ml. In the third step, the staff
• 2 Other studies have used weekly and often monthly or quarterly
data to examine what are frequently very short-run issues. See, for exam-
ple, Spindt and Tarhan (1983,1987), Tinsley et al. (1982), Jones (1981),
Johannes and Rasche (1981), Feige and McGee (1977), and Gavin and
Karamouzis (1985).
• 3 See Axilrod (1982,1985).
• 4 Poole (1982) disputes this claim, arguing that the Fed actually
used borrowed reserves as its short-run target and that under the lagged
reserve requirements in effect at the lime, it should have been using free
reserves. Notice, however, that since free reserves equal nonborrowed re-
serves minus required reserves, which are fixed in any given week under
lagged reserve requirements, over any weekly period nonborrowed re-
serves and free-reserves targeting are functionally equivalent. Spindt and
Tarhan (1987) present evidence supporting the view that over an inter-
FOMC operating horizon, the Federal Reserve, from fall 1979 through fall
1982, followed a nonborrowed reserves operating target. Over shorter
(weekly) intervals, however, their results are ambiguous.
derived the target growth paths for borrowed
and nonborrowed reserves on the basis of the
short-run path for Ml. Step four was repeated each
week. Incoming information about the money mul-
tiplier, unexpected changes in the mix of deposits,
and unexpected changes in the demands for cur-
rency, excess reserves, and borrowed reserves
were used to translate the inter-meeting objective for
nonborrowed reserves into a target for the reserve
maintenance week. "On Friday," Stevens argues,
"...objectives ... can be set, reflecting any technical
corrections and judgmental adjustments to the inter-
meeting reserve objectives ...." Step five translated the
weekly objective into a daily program. At this level,
changes in nonborrowed reserves were primarily re-
active to very short-run changes in the market factors
absorbing and supplying reserve funds. These fac-
tors included such items as Treasury operations, Fed-
eral Reserve float, and unexpected discount window
borrowing. Although federal funds rate targeting was
not explicitly used, funds rate changes were some-
times read by policymakers as indicators of changes in
these underlying factors, which would have prompted
daily adjustments in nonborrowed reserves.
We focus on the last two steps, examining
how unexpected shocks to money and the fed-
eral funds rate influenced weekly and daily re-
serve operations. We also examine how reserve
changes affected money and the funds rate.
Open market operations have a direct effect
on money via the creation or destruction of bank
deposits, while indirect effects may work through
the funds rate. The use of daily data allows us
to study feedback effects. That is, changes in re-
serves induce changes in money and the federal
funds rate, which may ultimately cause addi-
tional changes in reserves because policymakers
cannot distinguish them from other money or
interest-rate shocks.
5
The general lack of daily data and the ana-
lytical complexity of combining five daily mod-
els into an empirically tractable system forces
us to restrict our description of the daily money
supply process to a straightforward structure.
6
In this spirit, a reasonably accurate—but admit-
tedly simplified—model of the bank reserves
• 5 Avery (1979) models monetary policy as an endogenous vari-
able. His results suggest that over the 1955-75 period, feedback effects
occurred within a month.
• 6 A more complex model of short-run money supply over the pe-
riod studied here is provided in Goodfriend et al. (1986). Other authors,
including Judd and Scadding (1982), have suggested linkages between
the federal funds rate and money demand, working through interest-rate
term structures. Since the current model and subsequent empirical work
ignore interest rates other than the federal funds rate, the maintained as-
sumption is that the term structure shifts proportionately with changes in
the funds rate. Spindt and Tarhan (1987) provide results that support this
assumption for our sample period.market during the November 1979 to mid-
summer 1982 period would focus on three key
variables: 1) nonborrowed reserves (NBR), 2)
the federal funds rate (FFRT), and 3) the equilib-
rium quantity of transaction money (TRAN). Such
a model may be written as
(1) NBRl=auFFRTt+a'uXt+eu,
(2) FFRT,= a2lNBRt+a'22Xt+e2l,
(3) THAN, = a}1 NBR t + a 32 FFRT,
+ a'iiX!+eir
where
Xt is a vector of relevant exogenous variables,
a ( represents behavioral parameters (or vec-
tor a' of parameters), t is time measured in
days, and e it is normally distributed random
disturbances, which are serially uncorrelated
(though they may be correlated with each other).
This is a block recursive model in which non-
borrowed reserves and the funds rate are deter-
mined simultaneously in the federal funds market
(equation [1] represents NBR supply and equa-
tion [2] NBR demand), and the equilibrium quanti-
ties of NBR and FFRT help to contemporaneously
determine TRAN. Thus, feedback is allowed be-
tween FFRT and NBR, but not between TRAN
and NBR. The rationale for this is based both on
the instiaitional fact of lagged reserve requirements,
under which required reserves held in week three
were based on transaction accounts held in week
one, and on the view that neither the Federal Re-
serve nor the market observed changes in aggre-
gate money during the day.
Analysis of the dynamic relationships
among the endogenous variables is facilitated














The functional relationships among the
reduced-form errors (the v's) are identical to the
contemporaneous relationships that exist among





Thus, analysis of the reduced-form errors in
equations (7)-(9) will provide impulse-response
functions identical to those obtained by analyz-
ing the structural model directly.
7
The reduced-form equations (4) - (6) are esti-
mated as a set of vector autoregressions (VARs),
where the X's in each equation are a set of lagged
endogenous variables (with some minor additions).
This particular choice of exogenous variables im-
plies that the v's in (7)-(9) will be one-step-ahead
forecast errors.
The VAR methodology, pioneered by Sims
(1980, 1982), was adopted primarily because of
the difficulty of collecting more-traditional ex-
ogenous variables on a daily basis.
8 Many ex-
ogenous variables that have been used in weekly
or monthly money-demand models are simply
not available on a daily basis. Use of the VAR
methodology allows us to get around this prob-
lem by thinking of the lagged endogenous vari-
ables as instruments for a more complex set of
X's. An additional advantage of using lagged en-
dogenous variables is that it allows us to perform
a relatively simple calculation of the dynamic
• 7 Briefly, this can be seen as follows. Consider the simultaneous
equation system
Y,= 6V, PX, + ev , v
where Y,, X t, and e, are vectors of endogenous, exogenous, and ran-
dom errors, respectively, and B and P are matrices of coefficients. The




l From the latter relationship, it is clear that
u, = But + et,
of which equations (7) - (9) are but a special case.
• 8 A few examples will give the flavor of the types of variables that
might be used in a more explicit model. Under the system of lagged reserve
requirements in existence during the study period, required reserves were
fixed within each reserve maintenance week (Thursday-Wednesday) and
were determined by required reserve ratios and the two-week lagged values
of reservable liabilities. The demand for excess reserves is affected by a num-
ber of factors, including the volume of reserve account transactions and the
risk preferences of individual banks. The supply of reserves is influenced by
the demand for borrowed reserves, which depends in part on the spread be-
tween the federal funds rate and the discount rate, and the degree of "moral
suasion" exerted at the discount window.reaction of the system to shocks without having
to specify or estimate the dynamic behavior of
the exogenous variables separately.
Even with the assumption that money is de-
termined recursively, the structural parameters of
equations (7)-(9) cannot be calculated from the
reduced-form equations without further restriction
because of the simultaneous determination of
NBR and FFRT. A traditional identifying assump-
tion would be that the reserve supply is set dur-
ing the previous period and thus is exogenous.
However, we decided that this assumption is in-
appropriate in the daily model, since we are fo-
cusing on the reaction of the Federal Reserve
Open Market Desk to unforeseen changes in the
economic environment. Moreover, as shown in
the next section, it also turns out to be inconsis-
tent with the positive contemporaneous relation-
ship observed empirically between the two
variables (or between their one-step-ahead fore-
cast errors, vl and v2). An alternative, albeit arbi-
trary, restriction was therefore imposed.
We assumed that the structural coefficient
representing the effect of a contemporaneous
change in reserves on the federal funds rate, a21,
was identical to the structural coefficient of the
previous day's reserve change on the funds
rate (an element of a'22). This additional as-
sumption, which identifies the entire system,
centers around the belief that banks trading in
the federal funds market smooth the price of
reserves from day to day. This may occur for
two reasons. First, because of lags in the sys-
tem, it isn't clear that traders can actually de-
tect "new" reserves within a day. Second,
during the study period, reserve accounting
took place on a weekly rather than daily basis.
Reserves on any one day of the maintenance
period were almost perfect substitutes for re-
serves on another day. Thus, the relevant re-
serve quantity in determining the funds rate
was an estimate of "weekly" reserves, which
would be equally affected by contemporane-
ous and one-day-lagged shocks.
9
II. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the dynamic
relationships of the three variables discussed
above—nonborrowed reserves, the federal
funds rate, and money as measured by transac-
• 9 The robustness of this assumption was tested in estimating the
impulse-response functions (presented in the next section) by resetting the
coefficient a21 to one-half and to two times the structural coefficient of the
previous day's reserve change. In neither case were the substantive conclu-
sions drawn from calculating the impulse-response functions changed.
tion accounts. Data on each of these variables
were collected for the five working days
(Thursday through Wednesday) of the 139 re-
serve maintenance weeks from November 7,
1979 through June 30, 1982. This represents a
relatively homogeneous period with respect to
the operating procedures of monetary policy
following the Federal Reserve's October 1979
adoption of reserve targeting. The only likely
deviation occurred during the April-August
1980 period of credit controls. Our calculations
for this interval are characterized by an inter-
cept shift in all estimated equations.
Data were collected from several sources.
Systemwide nonborrowed reserves were taken
from the Federal Reserve's daily balance sheet
and then corrected for "as-of" adjustments and
overdrafts.
1
0 Transaction accounts were meas-
ured as the sum of gross demand deposits, auto-
matic transfers from savings accounts, telephone
and preauthorized transfer accounts, and NOW
accounts and share drafts, minus demand bal-
ances due from depository institutions in the
United States, less cash items in the process of
collection. These data, designated TRAN, were
gathered at the individual bank level and then ag-
gregated daily across all Federal Reserve member
banks.
1
1 The federal funds rate was measured as
the daily weighted average computed by the Fed-
eral Reserve.
Sample means and standard deviations for
the variables used in this study are presented
in table 1. Average levels for each variable are
given, as are average changes by day of the
week. The data show substantial variation in
the day-by-day change in every variable. For
example, Friday and Monday appear to have
been especially atypical for member-bank
transaction accounts. Each Friday, an average
of $9-8 billion flowed out of these accounts,
and on Monday $13.4 billion flowed in. The
Friday outflow may have resulted either from
the weekend migration of transaction accounts
to higher yields, from Eurodollar arbitrage be-
havior by the big banks that was common
• 10 As-of adjustments are corrections made up to three weeks later
to reflect errors in the original accounting. Overdrafts are negative bal-
ances not reflected in the original accounting.
• 11 TRAN is taken from the Report of Deposits submitted to the Fed-
eral Reserve tor the purpose of computing required reserves. The data used
are final "hard" numbers subject to little revision. It should be noted that the
money supply data were released each Friday and were computed from dif-
ferent sources than those used for JUAN. However, the TRAN definition
was chosen after extensive conversations with the Federal Reserve staff re-
sponsible for computing the monetary aggregates over the sample period.
They indicated that JUAN would be extremely highly correlated with the ag-







Total system excess reserves

































































a. The federal funds rate is measured in basis points. Ail other variables are measured in millions of dollars. All data are nonseasonally adjusted.
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
over part of the estimation period, or from
banks' attempts to reduce reservable liabilities
over the Friday to Sunday period.
The more-than-compensating Monday in-
flow may reflect the return of Friday's funds
and the Monday posting of weekend transac-
tions.
1
2 In addition, it is interesting to observe
that the average federal funds rate fell on both
Tuesday (10 basis points) and Wednesday (25
basis points). However, these declines were
more than offset by the 40-basis-point average
increase on Thursday. This may reflect either a
falloff in reserve demand toward the end of
the reserve maintenance week (because risk-
averse banks obtained their reserves earlier) or
an expansion of reserve supply. It may also in-
dicate risk-averse actions on the part of the
Federal Reserve Board to supply reserves and
thus avoid a large swing in the funds rate.
Prior to use in the regression analysis, the
raw data had to be adjusted. To control for
trends, we converted each variable to a daily
first difference. Because data were not other-
wise seasonally adjusted, variables were fur-
ther transformed to deviations around seasonal
(monthly) means. We computed values for the
10 bankers' holidays per year using predicted
values from auxiliary regressions similar in
form to those ultimately used in the analysis,
but employing only those observations with
complete data.
The basic VARs were estimated utilizing all
three variables: NBR, TRAN, and FFRT. Results
for these regressions are available in Avery and
Kwast (1986). We regressed the daily change
in each variable against both the lagged daily
changes in the current and previous reserve
week and the weekly changes of the second
through fourth lagged reserve weeks for each
of the three series.
1
3 In addition, we used vari-
ables representing the FOMC's short-run path
for Ml, an intercept shift for the April-August
1980 credit control period, and binary vari-
ables for the day, the day after, and two days
after a Social Security payment (generally the
third of each month), as well as for the end of
a quarter. These variables were designed to
capture what are commonly recognized as the
most important seasonal effects not accounted
for by the transfonnation using monthly means.
Each regression was fit separately for all five
days in the reserve week, utilizing the 139 sam-
ple weeks of data.
The first-differencing and VAR forms of the
regressions appear to have removed most first-
• 12 Such transactions include deposits by retail stores and auto-
mated teller machine activity.
• 13 The choice of lag structure reflects a trade-off between nonrestric-
tive completeness and estimation parsimony. Once daily observations for the
previous week were included, the model results were not particularly sensi-
tive to the lag specification of the endogenous variables.FIGURE 1
Cumulative Response to a $200-
Milllon-per-Day Net Shock to NBR





NOTE: Cumulative net change.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
TABLE 2
Cumulative Response to a $200-
Million-per-Day Net Shock to NBR
Maintained for Five Days
Variable
One Two Three Four Five
Week Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks
NBR change
3 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Percent change
5 2.48 2.48 2.48 2.48 2.48
FFRT change
0 -87.7 -113.0 -56.9 -90.9 -91.0
(15.5) (31.5) (26.6) (27.3) (40.9)
Percent change
1
5 -5.98 -7.70 -3.88 -6.20 -6.20
order serial correlation from the equation re-
siduals, with estimated first-order serial correla-
tion coefficients of 0.02, -0.02, and 0.06 for
NBR, TRAN, and FFRT, respectively.
1
4 The av-
erage contemporaneous residual correlation is
0.27 between NBR and TRAN, 0.10 between
FFRT and TRAN, and 0.15 between NBR and
FFRT. As mentioned earlier, the positive corre-
lation between NBR and FFRT led us to adopt
our somewhat arbitrary identifying restriction
for the model. When structural parameters
were determined using the lagged identifying
restriction, the imposed coefficient was the
"right" sign and "a reasonable order of magni-
tude" in all five cases (there is a separate





We are concerned here with the magnitude,
sign, and significance of the impulse-response
functions of each endogenous variable with re-
spect to an exogenous shock to both itself and
the other endogenous variables. The contem-
poraneous effects follow directly from estimates
of the ciy's computed by solving the sample
analog of equations (7)-(9). The effect of ex-
ogenous shocks on future values of the endo-
genous variables does not follow as straight-
forwardly. However, given a solution to the
contemporaneous relationships of (7)-(9), fu-
ture effects could be computed by solving for
the moving-average representation of the VAR
structure in equations (4)-(6).
Below, we examine the reactions of the sys-
tem to two different shocks. The first is the esti-
mated impact of an unexpected change in non-
borrowed reserves, and the second is the reaction
of policymakers to a shock to money demand.
77?^Vchange
a 447.8 -209.4 -734.2 122.8 1,098.7
(170.0) (601.0) (822.3) (788.4) (896.7)
Percent change
1
5 0.21 -0.10 -0.34 0.06 0.52
a. Cumulative net change, millions of dollars.
b. Based on average values over the estimation period.
c. Cumulative net change, basis points.






Figure 1 displays calculated responses of each
variable to a net $1.0 billion positive shock to
• 14 Higher-order serial coefficients were smaller in absolute magni-
tude than these, and none was statistically significant.
• 15 The structural parameter estimates are not reported here be-
cause the impulse-response functions derived from them are, for pur-
poses of this paper, more meaningful. The impulse-response functions
are presented in the next section.FIGURE 2
Cumulative Response to a $200-
Million-per-Oay Gross Shock to
TRAN Maintained for Five Days
Millions of dollars Basis points
NOTE-. Cumulative net change.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
NBR ($200 million per day for five days).
1
6 A
net change was simulated to represent a shift in
the weekly objective for NBR growth, which pre-
sumably would be represented by a net rather
than a gross change in NBR. Because the model
is first-differenced, the figures presented are cu-
mulative moving averages. Approximate standard
errors at intervals of one through five weeks are
displayed in table 2. These were calculated using
bootstrap methods, since analytic derivation
would have been extremely difficult.
1
7
As seen in the figure, FFRT responds quite
rapidly and inversely to the change in NBR In
fact, the two-week response is greater than the
five-week response. By five weeks, FFRT has de-
clined more than 6 percent. Given the 2.4 percent
change in NBR, this implies a short-run elasticity
with respect to nonborrowed reserves of -2.5.
• 16 The linearity ot the model makes the size of the shock unimpor-
tant, since the values of the multipliers are independent of the shock's
size. The shock simulated is one that offsets any implied feedback (even
in the near future) and that provides an additional $200 million injection
per day for five days. Thus, the shock is equivalent to a net injection.
• 17 The estimated covariance of the VARs was calculated assuming a
three-equation system with contemporaneously correlated, but serially un-
correlated, errors. The resulting coefficient covariance matrix was used to
generate 50 random multivariate normal coefficient vectors centered on the
estimated parameter vector. Simulated moving-average responses were then
derived for each of the random coefficient vectors (contemporaneous coeffi-
cients were also adjusted), and the sample standard deviation of the cumula-
tive responses was calculated at each point in time. These estimates suggest
that the cumulative moving averages are significantly different from zero.
Initially, TRAN rises, fueled primarily by the
contemporaneous correlation that is probably
due to the open market operation itself. During
weeks two and three, cumulative TRAN changes
are actually negative, and it is not until week five
that there is any appreciable increase. Even then,
the implied "money multiplier" (ignoring currency
and other transaction accounts) is only slightly
larger than one. This suggests that most of the ef-
fects of an unexpected change in nonborrowed
reserves were absorbed by changes in borrowing,
excess reserves, or cash—not by changes in
transaction accounts. To investigate this possibil-
ity, reduced-form models identical to those of
NBR, FFRT, and THAN (same independent vari-
ables and lagged endogenous variables) were
run for excess and borrowed reserves. Assuming
a recursive contemporaneous ordering, response
functions similar to those shown in figure 1 were
calculated for both variables. After three weeks,
declines in borrowing and increases in excess re-
serves were estimated to total $1,187 million
more than the injection of reserves. By week
five, decreases in borrowing totaled $423 million
and increases in excess reserves were estimated
at $323 million. Together, these results imply that
almost three-quarters of the reserve injection was







The short-run reaction of the money market,
particularly nonborrowed reserves, to a change
in money may be examined with calculations
similar to those utilized in the previous subsec-
tion. The difference is that in this case, a shock
is exerted on TRAN, and feedback (on TRAN)
is allowed. Figure 2 presents the results of a
$200-million-per-day gross positive shock to
TRAN maintained for five days.
1
8 For reasons
that will become apparent below, the results
of this simulation are displayed out to seven
• 18 Ceteris paribus, this is also a large shock and would increase
TRAN by 25 percent if continued for one year with no feedback. With
feedback, the shock would increase TRAN by 8.5 percent. We handle
contemporaneous correlations the same way as in the NBR simulations.
Neither NBR nor FFRT is assumed to react to contemporaneous TRAN;
thus, there is no intraday feedback.TABLE 3
Cumulative Response to a $200-
Million-per-Day Gross Shock to

























































































a. Cumulative net change, millions of dollars.
b. Based on average values over the estimation period.
c. Cumulative net change, basis points.
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
weeks. Approximate standard errors are given
in table 3.
Without feedback, the gross change in TRAN
would have been $1.0 billion. The data plotted
in figure 2, however, show that at the end of
five weeks the net increase is only $343 mil-
lion. Thus, only about 35 percent of the gross
increase in TRAN persists for five or more
weeks. The path of this change is also of inter-
est. After an initial increase, TRAN declines
through week four and then begins to rise. The
time path of FFRT is similar (though reversed
in sign) to that of TRAN. After an initial decline,
FFRT rises through week three and then starts
to fall again. The decline in FFRT at the end
of five weeks is somewhat surprising, although
small and, as judged by estimated standard
errors, apparently insignificant.
The most interesting results of this simulation
are suggested by the NBR data. During the first
two weeks of the positive money shock, the
Federal Reserve withdraws reserves, perhaps
in response to the initial decline in the funds
rate. By the end of three weeks, however, $80
million of NBR has been injected. After five
weeks, $11 million has been withdrawn, while
a net addition of $43 million is observed at the
end of seven weeks. This pattern of withdraw-
als and injections is roughly consistent with the
changes in reserve demand that occur under
lagged reserve requirements. In that case, an
increase in money translates into greater re-
serve demand in the third week of these calcu-
lations (the second week after the monetary
shock). Thus, the simulated pattern for NBR, re-
flecting the timing required by lagged reserve
requirements, strongly suggests that under this
system, the Federal Reserve did accommodate
at least some of the increase in money.
An estimate of the extent of central bank ac-
commodation may be computed as follows.
Consider the $43 million net increase in NBR
supplied by the end of week seven. Clearly,
this would not support the total $1.0 billion
shock to TRAN. However, the Federal Reserve
never really observes the $1.0 billion increase,
but sees only the net changes shown in figure
2. The appropriate procedure is to compare
the permanent increase in NBR with the in-
crease in required reserves resulting from the
permanent increase in TRAN. Assuming that
the shock to 77^4^ is the only shock to money,
that all of the net increase in nonborrowed re-
serves goes to member banks, and that the
marginal reserve requirement is the transaction
account limit in effect over the estimation
period (16.25 percent), then the data underly-
ing figure 2 imply that the Federal ReserveTABLE 4
Cumulative Response after Five Weeks
to a One-Day, $1.0 Billion Net Shock to
NBR Administered on Different Days
Variable Thursday Friday Monday
a. Cumulative net change, millions of dollars.
b. Based on average values over the estimation period.
c. Cumulative net change, basis points.









































accommodated about 65 percent of the increase
in required reserves during the sample period.
1
9
As an additional test, a shock was simulated
that was identical to that of figure 2 in week one,
but negative and offsetting in week two (so that
the cumulative change in TRAN was close to
zero after two weeks). In this case, we estimated
that the Federal Reserve would supply more than
100 percent of the reserves required (assuming a
16.25 percent reserve requirement) for the week-
one shock. This suggests that the Fed may have
been even more willing to accommodate money
shocks when they appeared to be temporary.
Day-of-the-Week
Effects
One of the premises underlying the use of the
particular model forms employed in this paper
is the view that causal relationships might have
differed by the day of the week. The estimated
model system allows us to test this premise.
To examine the importance of a given day,
we performed calculations identical to those
presented in figure 1, but with the shock ap-
plied to only one day of the week. Results are
displayed in table 4. The five-week multiplier
• 19 Using weekly data for the October 1979-October 1982 period
and a somewhat different methodology, Spindt and Tarhan (1987) esti-
mate virtually the same degree of accommodation in nonborrowed re-
serves. They suggest that"... of an increase in required reserves caused
by an increase in money almost 2/3 were supplied in non-borrowed form
and about 1/3 in borrowed form." (p. 113)
for TRAN ranges from a high of $1.45 per dollar
of NBR for a Friday shock to a low of $0.69 for
a Wednesday shock. The five-week interest-rate
multiplier ranges from a Tuesday high of 1.119
basis points per million dollars of NBR to a low
of -0.074 for a Thursday shock. To examine
whether these differences are statistically signifi-
cant, we performed "Wald-type" chi-square tests
using the approximate covariance matrix of the
five-week multipliers. Chi-squares testing the
equality of daily coefficients were 3.46 for TRAN
and 8.49 for FFRT, with only the latter significant
at the 10 percent level. Thus, while the quantita-
tive variation is large, it is difficult to tell deci-
sively whether the daily variations are important.
IV. Conclusion
The short-run money multiplier for nonborrowed
reserves appears, at least over the period consid-
ered here, to be quite small relative to its poten-
tial long-run value. The estimated short-run
multiplier for total transaction accounts of 1.1 is
only 18 percent of the long-run value of 6.2 im-
plied by the highest reserve ratio in effect over
the estimation period. In the short run, banks ap-
pear to accommodate almost three-quarters of a
change in nonborrowed reserves by altering
their holdings of excess reserves and borrow-
ings. Thus, the size of the open market operation
needed to achieve a desired change in money ap-
pears to be much larger in the short run than that
needed to effect the same change in the long run.The Federal Reserve's short-run influence
over the funds rate is considerably greater than
that over money. The estimated short-run elas-
ticity of the funds rate with respect to nonbor-
rowed reserves is -2.5. This contrasts with an
estimated short-run elasticity of transaction ac-
counts with respect to nonborrowed reserves of
0.2. Taken together, these results suggest that
(again over the time period considered) al-
though a short-run change in nonborrowed re-
serves could quickly and substantially affect
the federal funds rate, the induced change in
money in the short run was much smaller. Thus,
the Fed may have had to accept substantial
interest-rate volatility in counteracting short-
term shocks to money. Viewed from this per-
spective, the apparent Federal Reserve policy
in 1979-82 of supplying about 65 percent of
the increase in reserves needed to accommo-
date a short-run increase in money may have
been prudent, since it helped to avoid an even
larger increase in short-term interest rates.
Finally, over much of the period covered here,
there was considerable debate about whether,
given its reserves operating procedure, the Fed-
eral Reserve should have substituted a system of
contemporaneous reserve requirements for the
extant lagged reserves system. A contemporane-
ous system, it was argued, could have substan-
tially improved short-run money control.
The results presented here suggest that, during
the period under examination, depository institu-
tions at least partially delayed their response to a
money shock by two weeks—the exact timing
implied by lagged reserve requirements. Specifi-
cally, a positive shock to money was estimated
to lower the funds rate initially and then to put
upward pressure on it in the second week after
the shock. This suggests that contemporaneous
reserve requirements would likely have acceler-
ated the response of the funds rate to a change
in money demand, since reserve demand would
have responded contemporaneously rather than
with a lag. However, the modest short-run inter-
est elasticity of money estimated in this study sug-
gests that the quicker response of the funds rate
would not, ceteris paribus, have resulted in a sub-
stantial short-run reversal of the shock to money.
Thus, it appears that while contemporaneous re-
serve requirements would likely have resulted in
a modest improvement to short-run monetary
control, the Federal Reserve would still have
faced a rather sharp short-run trade-off between
interest-rate volatility and monetary control.
2
0
• 20 Indeed, the Fed implemented a contemporaneous reserves sys-
tem in February 1984, but only after switching to a borrowed reserves
(interest-rate-smoothing) procedure.
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